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THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff - Respondent 
vs. 
WILLIAM ROBERTS CHIPMAN 
Defendant - Appellant. 
Case No. 15023 
DEFENDANT - APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of Section 
41-6-44 U.C.A. (1953), driving or controlling a vehicle under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried in the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for the County of Salt Lake, the Honorable Ernest 
F. Baldwin presiding with a jury, and found guilty by the jury of 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE.~ 
Appellant prays that the judgment of the lower court be reversed 
and the case be remanded with instructions to dismiss complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of October 30, 1975, appellant was asleep in his 
friends truck parked off of the Brooklane Circle in Salt Lake County. 
The truck was completely off the road with the motor turned off. 
Officer Schipaanboard, of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department 
was dispatched to the scene because a neighbor thought someone 
was ill and slumped over the seat of the truck. Officer Schipaanboard 
did not observe any violation of law, but decided to wake up 
appellant anyway. After taking some ten minutes to awaken appellant, 
Officer Sdb~paanboard detected the smell of alcohol and appellant was 
subsequently placed under arrest for violation of Section 41-6-44 
U.C.A. (1953), driving or being in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Appellant was taken to 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office where alcohol influence tests 
and a report were refused by appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT RELIES 
EXCLUSIVELY ON ACTS OCCURRING PRIOR TO THE TIME THE ARRESTING OFFICER 
DISCOVERED APPALLANT'S VEHICLE BECAUSE: 
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(A) THE ARRESTING OFFICER COULD NOT VALIDLY ARREST APPELLANT 
FOR A MISDEMEANOR THE OFFICER DID NOT WITNESS: AND, 
(B) THE EVIDENCE OF DRIVING OR CONTROLLING A VEHICLE IS 
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. 
Section 41-6-44 (a) provided, "It is unlawful ••• for any 
person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive 
or be in actual physical control of any vehicle • It 
The arresting officer did not have the right to arrest appellant 
for any acts prior to the officer's arrival because the officer 
witnessed no driving or controlling prior to his arrival and a legal 
arrest for a misdemeanor cannot be made without a warrant unless 
the offense was committed in the presence of the arresting officer. 
Utah Liquor Control Commission vs. Vatsis, 112 Utah 282, 186 P .2d 
975. 
The offense charged included the element of driving or controlling 
a vehicle, plus the element of being in an intoxicated condition which 
affects a persons driving ability. In order to sustain a conviction 
for driving "under the influence" of intoxicating liquor, there must 
be evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that intoxication affected the 
ability of the accused to drive. Luellen vs. State, 64 Okl.Cr. 382, 
81 P .2d 323. Section 41-6-44 (b) raises a presumption that a person 
with a breathalyzer test result greater than 0.10 percent is acting 
"under the influence," but that presumption does not relieve the 
state of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element 
of a crime charged. In the case at hand, the appellant did not take 
a chemical or breathalyzer and there was not conclusive evidence of 
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driving under the influence. 
The conclusion that appellant was driving under the influence 
of alcohol can be supported only by circumstantial evidence that 
appellant was intoxicated at the time he was found asleep in his 
car, and there are several possible explanations which support the 
constitutional presumption of innocence which are consistent with 
that evidence. Appellant could have become intoxicated after he parked 
the car or someone else could have driven the car to its parking 
place. The evidence is therefore insufficient as a matter of law 
to base appellant's conviction on acts prior to the arrival of the 
arresting officer. State vs. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 P .2d 911. 
POINT II 
THE CONVICTION IN THE LOWER COURT MUST ALSO BE REVERSED IF THE 
JURY BASED ITS FINDING ON CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT INTRODUCED AS 
EVIDENCE OF HIS CONDITION AFTER THE POLICE OFFICERS APJtiVED BECAUSE: 
(A) APPELLANT DID NOT DRIVE OR CONTROL !liE VEHICLE SUBSEQUENT 
TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE OFFICER; 
(B) THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT IS CHARGED IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS IF IT APPLIES TO A PARTY WHO IS ADMITTEDLY ASLEEP AT ALL 
RELEVANT TIMES NECESSARY TO CHARGE HIM WITH ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
(C) THE STATUTE IF APPLIED TO A SLEEPING PERSON, EITHER 
INTOXICATED OR NOT, CONSTI1~TES CRUEL ~~ utWSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
Officer Schipaanboard testified that when he arrived on the 
scene, appellant's truck was not running, and appellant ,.,as asleep 
on the seat of his vehicle. He futher testified, as did other 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
witnesses, that it took from 5 to 20 minutes to awaken the 
appellant. (emphasis supplied). 
It is obvious from the testimony of the arresting officer 
that the appellant was neither in actual or physical control of 
the vehicle in the presence of the arresting officer, and his 
state of sleeping could not be presumed to have the intent to be 
in actual or physical control. Based upon these facts alone, 
the statute as applied to the appellant, violates due process 
of law, since all reasonable men would have to guess that its 
meaning included a person sleeping. Musser v. State, 333 U.S. 95; 
State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193. 
There are further reasons why the actual physical control 
clause is unconstitutional as applied to appellant. Section 
76-1-29 U.C.A. (1953), requires that, "In every crime or public 
offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and 
intent." The state failed to produce any evidence that appellant 
intended to drive or be in actual physical control of his vehicle. 
As for the act element which Section 76-1-20 requires, if Section 
41-6-44 (a) is applied to appellant, then it would appear that 
the legislature has made sleeping a crime. 
The particular reason why the conviction of the appellant 
must be reversed is that the facts and circumstances of the instant 
case fall nearly four-quarter with the facts and circumstances in 
State v. Bugger, 25 u. 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442, where this court clearly 
held that an appellant who was fast asleep in an automobile completely 
off the traveled portion of a street or highway was not in actual 
physical control within the meaning of the statute 41-6-44 U.C.A. U953). 
-5-
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CONCLUSION 
Section 41-6-44 U.C.A., (1953), cannot constitutionally be 
applied to the facts and circumstances of this case for the following 
reasons: 
(a) Appellant was not in actual physical control of the vehicle 
at a time when any competent witness could know of his intoxication. 
(b) The State has failed to sustain its burden of proof in 
establishing that appellant, if intoxicated, was under the influence 
while driving. 
(c) The appellant's condition of being asleep at the time 
the arresting officers arrived totally negates any intent necessary 
to establish the elements of a crime as provided in 76-1-20 U.C.A., 
(1953). 
(d) Said statute would be unconstitutional for vagueness if 
appellant's condition can be consttued to fall within the meaning 
of- the statute. 
Judgment of the lower court should be reversed and remanded 
by this honorable court with directions to dismiss the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of 
~~iled two copies of Brief of 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 
at 3060 Lester, Suite D., Granger, 
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